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ABSTRACT 
The current budgetary climate in the federal government is one of increasing 
uncertainty, making the long-term acquisition of critical weapon systems within the 
Department of Defense a challenging prospect. Rapid budget growth and a preoccupation 
with global military operations over the last fifteen years created a difficult environment to 
prioritize and track failed acquisition programs, resulting in a poor understanding of the 
actual root causes of program failures. By studying a subset of cancelled major defense 
acquisition programs, it is possible to achieve a better understanding of root causes for 
failure, and analyze whether there are commonalities among the root causes for failure to 
apply to future programs. This research informs military leadership and program executive 
officers of potential risk components in future acquisition programs that are critical to the 
achievement of national security objectives. Areas of particular concern include poor 
technology progression, negative congressional involvement, waiving milestone A, and a 
significant change in requirements. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. OVERVIEW 
The current budgetary climate in the federal government is one of increasing 
uncertainty, making the long-term acquisition of critical weapon systems within the 
Department of Defense (DOD) a challenging prospect. The approved DOD budget 
experienced a meteoric rise with a post–Cold War buildup beginning in 1998 and ending 
with the approval of the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011. In 1998, the budget was $255 
billion, and by 2010, the year before the enactment of the BCA, had increased to an all-time 
high of $696 billion (Office of the President of the United States, 2017). As Figure 1 
illustrates, a consumer price index (CPI) inflation adjustment reflects a budget figure of $361 
billion for 2010 with the actual budget being $696 billion, a 93% increase over the inflation-
only figure. 
 
Figure 1.  DOD Budget Authority (billions of 2010 US$). Source: Conetta (2010). 
Rapid budget growth and a preoccupation with global military operations created a 
difficult environment to prioritize and track failed acquisition programs, resulting in a poor 
understanding of the actual root causes of program failures. 
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To counteract budget growth, Congress passed the Budget Control Act of 2011 to 
“reduce the budget deficit by $2.1 trillion over the period FY2012–FY2021” (Williams, 
2017, Summary section, para. 1). According to Lynn Williams (2017) of the Congressional 
Research Service, “the BCA limits apply separately to defense and nondefense discretionary 
budget authority and are enforced by a mechanism called sequestration. Sequestration 
automatically cancels previously enacted spending to reduce discretionary spending to the 
limits specified in the BCA” (p. 2). Table 1 depicts the effects of the BCA and sequestration 
with the DOD budget authority for Fiscal Year (FY) 2010–FY2016. 
Table 1.   Department of Defense (051) Discretionary Budget Authority, in 
Billions of Then-Year Dollars. Source: Office of the President of the 
United States (2017). 
Fiscal Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Department of Defense (051) 696 691 655 585 595 571 596 
 
As Figure 1 and Table 1 illustrate, the DOD budget experienced a significant decrease 
from FY2010–FY2013, followed by budget stagnation from FY2014–FY2016, a stark 
contrast to the extreme budget growth of the 1990s and 2000s. Although the BCA of 2011 is 
not the first time Congress utilized budget enforcement mechanisms to obtain fiscal 
objectives, it did signify a fundamental change in the overall DOD budgeting process 
(Williams, 2017). Although it is always a possibility that Congress could repeal the BCA, the 
concept of enacting and executing sustainable budget practices is crucial to accomplishing 
programs that align with the National Security Strategy (NSS). 
The implications of the BCA of 2011 are noteworthy. With fiscal constraint comes an 
emphasis on efficiency and eliminating wasteful practices. Front and center are failed 
acquisition programs that jeopardize the strategic direction of the United States military by 
not providing crucial capabilities to the warfighter, but also by creating unrecoverable sunk 
costs. The sequestration environment limits the available budget resources necessary to 
accomplish these programs, which in turn elevates the impact of program failures. 
Ultimately, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) lists DOD weapon systems 
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acquisition as a high-risk area, underscoring the importance of executing programs in an 
effective and efficient manner. The GAO (2017) stated, “With the prospect of slowly-
growing or flat defense budgets for years to come, DOD must get better returns on its 
weapon systems investments and find ways to deliver capability to the warfighter on time 
and within budget” (p. 269). By researching and determining the root causes of previous 
failed acquisition programs, the DOD can better plan and manage its acquisitions to meet 
both budget and warfighter demands.  
B. AFFORDABILITY 
DOD Directive 5000.01, E1.1.4. Cost and Affordability, states, “All participants in 
the acquisition system shall recognize the reality of fiscal constraints” (Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics [OUSD(AT&L)], 2007, p. 
5). While this statement lacks specific details to apply the directive across the range of 
defense acquisition efforts, it does capture the spirit of the DOD viewpoint that executing 
programs within the current budget limitations is critical. Better Buying Power (BBP) 3.0, 
which encompasses a set of fundamental acquisition principles to achieve acquisition 
efficiency, lists achieving affordable programs as the top priority (DOD, n.d.). BBP states 
that achieving an affordable program means “conducting a program at a cost constrained by 
the maximum resources the department can allocate for a capability” (DOD, n.d., Achieve 
Affordable Programs section). Since the inception of the BCA, numerous DOD directives, 
including 5000.01 and BBP, reiterate the importance of efficiently utilizing the DOD budget. 
The common thread between all three variations of BBP is the top priority in each version, 
either targeting or achieving affordability. The strongest language comes from BBP 1.0, 
which mandates affordability as a requirement by setting an affordability objective and cap 
that acts as a key performance parameter (KPP) for the program (Carter, 2010). BBP 2.0 
reinforces this initiative and focuses attention on enforcing affordability caps to halt 
programs not within the predetermined range unless the program implements tradeoffs to 
reduce costs (Kendall, 2012). Finally, BBP 3.0 supports the affordability requirements from 
BBP 1.0 and 2.0, while emphasizing the need for an affordability analysis, oversight of 
affordability caps, and assessment of program performance against the caps (Kendall, 2015). 
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Table 2 summarizes the BBP initiatives for BBP 1.0 issued in 2010, BBP issued in 2012, and 
BBP 3.0 issued in 2015.  
Table 2.   Summary of BBP Initiatives. Adapted from Carter (2010) and  
Kendall (2012, 2015).  
BBP 1.0 BBP 2.0 BBP 3.0 
Target affordability and 
control cost growth 
Achieve affordable programs Achieve affordable programs 
Incentivize productivity 
and innovation in 
industry 
Control costs through the 
product life cycle 
Achieve dominant capabilities 




Incentivize productivity and 
innovation in industry and 
government 
Incentivize productivity in 
industry and government 
Improve tradecraft in 
services acquisition 
Eliminate unproductive 
processes and bureaucracy 
Incentivize innovation in 







processes and bureaucracy 
 Improve tradecraft in 
acquisition of services 
Promote effective competition 
 Improve the professionalism 
of the total acquisition 
workforce 
Improve the professionalism of 
the total acquisition workforce 
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In their article Affordability of Defense Acquisition Programs, Porter et al. (2015) 
concluded, 
Assuring the future affordability of acquisition programs in the Department of 
Defense (DOD) has been an enduring goal, which too frequently has not been 
achieved. The consequences are cancelling or curtailing programs that turn 
out to be unaffordable, with attendant waste. That has been true when total 
defense spending has been rising; it is a greater danger when total budgets are 
flat or declining. (p. iii) 
Affordability is not a new initiative; however, it assumed a greater importance with declining 
and stagnant defense budgets. By understanding that affordability is actually a strategic 
objective and requirement for defense acquisitions, the importance of executing fiscally 
responsible programs is clear. As BBP stated, it is the DOD’s mandate “to do more without 
more” (DOD, n.d., para. 1). 
C. IMPACTS OF FAILURE 
While the impacts of different program failures are never exactly alike, it is important 
to understand that the effects encompass a large scope of categories. Often the only impact 
considered is budgetary, and while the failure of a program often leads to the DOD losing 
billions of investment dollars, it can affect many areas of the acquisition enterprise 
(Clowney, Dever, & Stuban, 2016). In the wake of increasing budgetary pressures, it is 
imperative to manage acquisition programs more efficiently. A valuable portfolio 
management tool for running efficient programs is to understand the root causes and 
subsequent impacts of failed programs (GAO, 2014). At a minimum, the DOD must 
distribute the lessons learned from program failure to build and share knowledge to improve 
future program performance (GAO, 2014). Although it is important to note that cancellation 
is not synonymous with failure, Figure 2 illustrates the broad range of negative impacts from 
the cancellation of major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs).  
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Figure 2.  Program Cancellation Effects. Source: GAO (2014). 
The six program cancellation effects identify a range of potential impacts. A failing 
program may not experience all the typical cancellation impacts; however, the more critical 
and costly the program, the more likely it is to experience a broader set of cancellation 
effects. In the context of defense acquisition, MDAPs are often identified as both the most 
critical and costly programs; thus, they are the most susceptible to program cancellation 
effects. 
Program costs refer to costs incurred after cancellation. Known as “shutdown 
activities,” these costs include terminating or restructuring contracts and determining how to 
use program assets that offer value to the DOD (GAO, 2014). Agency budget impacts 
include all actions needed to reallocate funds from the canceled program to other projects or 
weapon programs. Capabilities delivery is the delay associated with providing requirements 
to satisfy NSS objectives and warfighter needs. During the delay, funds are often reallocated 
to legacy systems to provide warfighter support, but do not satisfy the long-term needs of the 
force. Industrial base effects refer to the diminished capacity of industrial sectors after 
program cancellation. In the long term, industry is less likely to provide key capabilities 
needed to sustain warfighter efforts. Staff and personnel impacts involve the loss of key 
acquisition personnel due to program cancellation and the logistics of reassigning the 
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workforce to other programs (GAO, 2014). Lastly, additional program partner impacts refer 
to the stakeholders other than the program office and warfighter who experience a negative 
effect from the cancellation. Common stakeholders are other military services, other 
countries involved in the acquisition, and other federal agencies such as the Defense Contract 
Management Agency (DCMA) Termination Center who experience an increased workload 
with the cancellation. Ultimately, understanding the impacts of program failure drives the 
need to discover the root causes associated with the failure to better plan and mitigate the 
possibility of future negative impacts. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Development of the primary and secondary research questions relate to the restrictive 
budget environment and negative impacts of failure for critical acquisition programs. By 
studying these research questions, future programs may incorporate lessons learned and 
mitigate the potential for failure. This is critical in a fiscally constrained environment where 
the DOD needs to efficiently execute its budget and avoid the negative effects of program 
failure. The following are the primary and secondary questions addressed in this research. 
Primary Questions 
• What are the root causes of failure for a selected subset of MDAPs? 
• Do the identified root causes fit into broad categories? 
Secondary Questions 
• Is it possible to normalize the root causes to apply more broadly to other MDAPs? 
• After normalizing for variables, are there commonalities between the root causes 
of failure in MDAPs? 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
To understand the context of root causes of failure in acquisition programs, it is 
important to review the different types of acquisition categories (ACATs), along with the 
DOD acquisition process, which is comprised of three main procurement processes. 
Furthermore, we discuss how Congress shapes many acquisition programs through budget 
enactment, legislation, and reporting requirements. Finally, we introduce a history of MDAP 
research studies to provide a foundation for the research methodology and analysis. Overall, 
this chapter establishes the framework necessary to understand the scope and analysis of the 
primary and secondary research questions. 
A. DEFENSE ACQUISITION PROCESS 
DOD Directive 5000.01 states, “The primary objective of Defense acquisition is to 
acquire quality products that satisfy user needs with measurable improvements to mission 
capability and operational support, in a timely manner, and at a fair and reasonable price” 
(OUSD[AT&L], 2007, p. 3). In this section, we provide a summary of the defense 
acquisition process by first providing an overview of acquisition categories, including ACAT 
I, ACAT II, and ACAT III. Next, we detail the DOD Decision Support Systems, commonly 
referred to as the “Big A” concept and map, which accomplishes the defense acquisition 
objective with the use of three main procurement processes. These processes comprise the 
Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS); Planning, Programming, 
Budget, and Execution (PPBE); and the Defense Acquisition System (DAS). The Defense 
Acquisition Guidebook describes the key differences between the three: “The requirements 
process is a capability gap process, the PPBE is a fiscal and time-based process, and the 
acquisition system is an event-based process” (DOD, 2017b). We detail each decision 
support system process to identify key characteristics, and the role of each in defense 
acquisition. Figure 3 shows the overlap for the three processes, each of which has a critical 
role in the acquisition process as an independent process and interdependent system. 
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Figure 3.  The DOD Decision Support Systems. Source: DOD (2017b). 
1. Acquisition Categories and Roles 
Defense acquisition programs receive an ACAT number designation (ACAT I 
through ACAT III) and type designation (MDAP, major automated information system 
[MAIS], or major system) based on cost thresholds or if the milestone decision authority 
(MDA) designates a program as special interest (DOD, 2017a). According to DOD 
Instruction 5000.01,  
The MDA is the designated individual with overall responsibility for a 
program. The MDA shall have the authority to approve entry of an acquisition 
program into the next phase of the acquisition process and shall be 
accountable for cost, schedule, and performance reporting to higher authority, 
including Congressional reporting. (OUSD[AT&L], 2003, p. 2) 
Assigning a program to a particular category substantially affects program procedures and 
policies, which impact team composition and projected timelines for the program (DOD, 
2017b). Table 3 depicts the different ACAT designations and decision authorities. 
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Table 3.   Description and Decision Authority for ACAT I-III Programs. 
Source: OUSD[AT&L] (2017). 
 
 
a. ACAT I 
ACAT I programs are synonymous with MDAPs and include programs designated by 
the MDA as special interest (OUSD[AT&L], 2017). To designate a program as ACAT I, 
either the total expenditure estimates for research, development, test, and evaluation 
(RDT&E) must exceed $300 million (based on FY1990 constant dollars), or an eventual total 
expenditure for procurement, including all planned increments or spirals must exceed $1.8 
billion (based on FY1990 constant dollars; Major Defense Acquisition Program Defined, 
2016). The adjusted dollar amounts for FY2014 are $480 million for RDT&E and $2.79 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 12 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
billion for procurement (OUSD[AT&L], 2017). The decision authority for ACAT I programs 
depends on a further ACAT ID or ACAT IC designation. ACAT ID programs are the most 
critical and of the highest interest. As such, the MDA is the defense acquisition executive 
(DAE) who is the under secretary of defense for acquisition, technology, and logistics 
(USD[AT&L]). The MDA for ACAT IC programs is the head of the DOD component, or if 
delegated, the component acquisition executive (CAE; OUSD[AT&L], 2017).  
b.  ACAT IA 
ACAT IA is synonymous with MAIS programs and also includes programs 
designated by the MDA as special interest (OUSD[AT&L], 2017). To designate a program as 
ACAT IA, the total expenditure estimates must meet at least one of the following criteria: if 
any single fiscal year costs exceed $32 million, if total expenditure estimates through 
deployment exceed $126 million, or if the total life-cycle costs exceed $378 million (all 
estimates are in FY2000 constant dollars; Definitions, 2013). The adjusted dollar amounts for 
FY2014 are $40 million for a single fiscal year, $165 million for costs through deployment, 
and $520 million for total life-cycle costs (OUSD[AT&L], 2017). The decision authority for 
ACAT IA programs depends on a further ACAT IAM or ACAT IAC designation. The MDA 
for ACAT IAM programs is the DAE, and the MDA for ACAT IAC programs is the head of 
the DOD component, or if delegated, the CAE (OUSD[AT&L], 2017). 
c. ACAT II 
ACAT II programs do not meet the criteria for ACAT I or ACAT IA programs but 
are a major system. A major system is a system for which the DOD is responsible and for 
which the total expenditure estimates for RDT&E must exceed $115 million (based on 
FY1990 constant dollars), or an eventual total expenditure for procurement must exceed 
$540 million (based on FY1990 constant dollars; Major Systems: Definitional Threshold 
Amounts, 1999). The adjusted dollar amounts for FY2014 are $185 million for RDT&E and 
$835 million for procurement (DOD, 2017b). The MDA for ACAT II programs is the CAE 
(OUSD[AT&L], 2017). 
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d. ACAT III 
ACAT III programs do not meet the criteria for ACAT II programs. ACAT III 
programs are any automated information system (AIS) programs that are not MAIS 
programs. The MDA for ACAT III programs is the CAE (OUSD[AT&L], 2017). 
2. Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System  
The JCIDS Manual, which implements the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(CJCS) Instruction 3170.01, governs the JCIDS process. The purpose of JCIDS is to identify 
and fill warfighter capabilities not met in the National Security Strategy (NSS), the National 
Defense Strategy (NDS), and the National Military Strategy (NMS; DOD, 2017b). According 
to the CJCSI 3170.01,  
The most critical aspect of the JCIDS process is to allow the JROC [Joint 
Requirements Oversight Council] and its subordinate boards, as informed by 
other stakeholders in the requirements process, to manage and prioritize 
capability requirements within and across capability requirement portfolios of 
the Joint Force, to inform other assessments within the Joint Staff, and to 
allow the JROC and CJCS to meet statutory responsibilities. (DOD, 2015, p. 
A-1) 
The JROC uses a capability-based assessment (CBA) to identify needed capabilities, 
capability gaps, and potential non-materiel and materiel solution options (DOD, 2017b). 
Significant gaps documented in the CBA eventually lead to the creation of an Initial 
Capabilities Document (ICD). The ICD is “a critical entry criterion for the Materiel 
Development Decision (MDD), and guides the Materiel Solution Analysis (MSA) phase 
activities and assessment of potential materiel solutions through an AoA or other studies” 
(DOD, 2015, p. A-15). In addition, it also documents potential non-materiel solution changes 
to fill capability gaps (DOD, 2015). The formal acquisition process begins when a MDA 
“considers, along with other pertinent information, a validated ICD identifying one or more 
capability requirements that may be best addressed with a new materiel capability solution, 
and documents a positive MDD in an Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM)” 
(OUSD[AT&L], 2015, p. B-20).  
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3. Planning, Programming, Budget, and Execution  
The PPBE process provides funding appropriations for DOD acquisition programs 
generated by the JCIDS process. The PPBE process consists of four phases: planning, 
programming, budgeting, and execution.  
a. Planning 
The planning phase coordinates development of the Defense Planning Guidance 
(DPG) between the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), joint staff, and services and 
combatant commanders. The DPG sets the framework for the Future Years Defense Plan 
(FYDP) and informs the services on what to include in Program Objectives Memorandums 
(POM) and Budget Estimate Submissions (BES; DOD, 2017b). Ultimately, the planning 
phase evaluates alternative strategies and develops guidance for programs initiated by the 
JCIDS process. 
b. Programming 
The programming phase requires that the services develop a POM that specifies 
proposed programs and details the required forces, manpower, and funding for the next five 
years. Proposed programs must be consistent with the DPG and other planning, 
programming, and fiscal guidance. The OSD director, Cost Assessment and Program 
Evaluation (D/CAPE), is responsible for the overall coordination of the programming phase 
(DOD, 2017b). Ultimately, the programming phase turns the DPG into detailed program 
submissions for JCIDS capability gaps. 
c. Budgeting 
The budgeting and programming phases occur simultaneously. During the budgeting 
phase, the services provide a detailed budget estimate in a budget estimate submission (BES) 
for the first two years of a program. After review, the program budget decisions (PBD) 
incorporate the final budget estimates, which, once signed by the secretary of defense 
(SECDEF), become part of the president’s budget request to Congress (OUSD[C], 2008). 
Ultimately, the budgeting phase ensures the efficient use of budgetary resources for programs 
initiated by the JCIDS process. 
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d. Execution 
The execution phase occurs simultaneously with both the budgeting, and 
programming phases. The execution phase assesses how current programs support the 
warfighter needs. Each service conducts annual execution reviews that assess compliance 
with SECDEF guidance, planning and programming guidance, and other metrics critical to 
program execution (DOD, 2013). The OSD reviews the services’ findings and recommends 
adjustments to the program or budget. Ultimately, the execution phase measures performance 
and adjusts resources to achieve goals for programs initiated during the JCIDS process. 
4. Defense Acquisition System  
The Defense Acquisition System relies on events such as milestones, phases, and 
decision points to guide the life cycle of acquisition programs. The purpose of the DAS is to  
Manage the nation’s investments in technologies, programs, and product 
support necessary to achieve the National Security Strategy and support the 
United States Armed Forces. The investment strategy of the Department of 
Defense shall be postured to support not only today’s force, but also the next 
force, and future forces beyond that. (OUSD[AT&L], 2007, p. 3) 
Overall, the DAS consists of five phases: materiel solution analysis (MSA), technology 
maturation and risk reduction (TMRR), engineering and manufacturing development (EMD), 
production and deployment, and operations and support (DOD, 2017b). Figure 4 depicts the 
Defense Acquisition System and the relationship between different milestones, phases, and 
decision points. 
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Figure 4.  The Defense Acquisition System. Source: DOD (2017b). 
a Materiel Solution Analysis and Milestone A 
The formal acquisition process begins with the MSA phase when the MDA validates 
the initial capabilities document and records a positive milestone development decision. 
Overall, the purpose of the MSA phase is to 
Conduct the analysis and other activities needed to choose the concept for the 
product that will be acquired, to begin translating validated capability gaps 
into system-specific requirements including the Key Performance Parameters 
(KPPs) and Key System Attributes (KSAs), and to conduct planning to 
support a decision on the acquisition strategy for the product. (DOD, 2017b, 
Chapter 1) 
An Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) assesses the trade space between all potential 
materiel solutions in terms of cost, schedule, risk, and performance. The findings of an AoA 
allow the “DAE and Service Sponsor to select a preferred materiel solution that addresses the 
capability gaps documented in the approved ICD” (DOD, 2017b, Chapter 2), as well as guide 
the MSA phase.  
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In addition, the MSA phase includes initial planning for the acquisition strategy by 
assigning a program office and program manager, and drafting a capability development 
document (CDD) that includes key performance parameters (KPPs) and key systems 
attributes (KSAs) from validated capability gaps. 
The acquisition strategy also includes a decision to pursue an evolutionary or single 
step acquisition. An evolutionary approach delivers capability in increments to supply an 
initial product to the warfighter more quickly and with improvements in future version 
releases (“Evolutionary Acquisition,” 2015). Programs that field separate, “incremental” 
capabilities with different milestones for each version release meet the criteria for an 
evolutionary acquisition approach. Starting in 2000, the DOD specified “evolutionary 
acquisition strategies as the preferred approach to satisfy operational needs” (OUSD[AT&L], 
2007, p. 3). As a preferred and not mandatory approach, the programs best suited to use an 
evolutionary strategy include attributes such as products that are liable to change, continuous 
requirements, low maintenance items, or projects with condensed schedules (Dillard & Ford, 
2009). Single step acquisitions, which produce a total system capability instead of 
increments, are appropriate if supported by precedent, or if funding, schedule, or size 
considerations dictate its use (OUSD[AT&L], 2007). Furthermore, programs best suited to 
use a single step strategy include attributes such as, products that are unlikely to change, 
binary requirements for key capabilities, or maintenance intensive products (Dillard & Ford, 
2009). 
The phase ends when the MDA certifies the results of the AoA along with other 
performance criteria to Congress, signifying the completion of Milestone A (DOD, 2017b).  
b. Technology Maturation and Risk Reduction, and Milestone B 
 The acquisition process continues into the TMRR phase with a review of the 
draft CDD to create a strategy to ensure the requirements are affordable and technically 
achievable. Overall, the purpose of the TMRR phase is to “reduce technology, engineering, 
integration, and life-cycle cost risk to the point that a decision to contract for Engineering & 
Manufacturing Development (EMD) can be made with confidence in successful program 
execution for development, production, and sustainment” (DOD, 2017b, Chapter 1). To 
accomplish TMRR, the program office utilizes methods such as active research and 
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competitive prototyping in conjunction with technology readiness levels (TRL) to assess the 
maturity of the technology. The Technology Readiness Assessment (TRA) Deskbook defines 
TRLs 1–9, with a 1 indicating the lowest level of technology maturity and a 9 indicating an 
operational system. Before Milestone B approval, the MDA must indicate the achievement of 
TRL 6, which is the demonstration of a prototype in a relevant environment (Office of the 
Director, Defense Research and Engineering [DDR&E], 2009). 
In addition, the TMRR phase includes developing a draft request for proposal (RFP) 
for development and a preliminary design review (PDR). The development RFP and 
subsequent RFP release decision ensure that the program office has solid capability 
requirements, an executable acquisition strategy, and an affordable program prior to releasing 
the solicitation. The development RFP release decision is critical to the success or failure of 
fielding the proposed system (OUSD[AT&L], 2017). The PDR establishes the allocated 
baseline and ensures that the proposed design has a reasonable expectation of meeting the 
system requirements within budget and schedule. The PDR ultimately allows the system to 
proceed to the critical design review (CDR) with an acceptable risk, and in accordance with 
10 U.S.C. § 2366, which requires approval before the completion of the TMRR phase (Major 
Systems and Munitions Programs: Survivability Testing and Lethality Testing Required 
Before Full-Scale Production, 2008). The phase ends when the MDA certifies the approval of 
the PDR, a positive RFP release decision, and a validated CDD, signifying the completion of 
Milestone B (OUSD[AT&L], 2017). 
c. Engineering and Manufacturing Development, and Milestone C 
The acquisition process continues into the EMD phase, which typically indicates the 
initiation of an actual acquisition program. The purpose of the EMD phase is to “develop, 
build, and test a product to verify that all operational and derived requirements have been met 
and to support production or deployment decisions” (DOD, 2017b, Chapter 1). Overall, the 
EMD phase results in the development of a proven systems capability and verification of an 
achievable and affordable manufacturing process. 
The two major reviews during the EMD phase are the CDR and the production 
readiness review (PRR). First, the CDR assesses the maturity of the design by demonstrating 
that the design satisfies the components of the CDD, such as the KPPs and KSAs. 
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Developmental prototyping for the system begins upon the approval of the CDR by the 
MDA. The second review for production readiness determines whether the system design 
and the manufacturer are ready to enter the production phase within an acceptable risk 
threshold (DOD, 2017b). The program team often uses an incremental strategy for the PRR 
to reduce the risk associated with a particular technology. The phase ends when the MDA 
validates the capability production document (CPD), which reflects all of the results gathered 
during EMD (OUSD[AT&L], 2017). 
d. Production and Deployment 
The production and deployment phase manufactures and fields the proposed system. 
This phase involves the following activities: Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP), Limited 
Deployment, Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E), Full-Rate Production (FRP), 
and full deployment (OUSD[AT&L], 2017). The key aspect of this phase is the initial 
operational capability (IOC), which indicates when a system can meet minimal operational 
capabilities outlined in the CPD (“Initial Operational Capability,” 2015).  
e. Operations and Support 
The operation and support (O&S) phase maintains the system during the life cycle. 
The O&S phase consists of two major efforts, sustainment and disposal. During sustainment, 
the system receives maintenance in the most cost-effective manner stipulated in the life-cycle 
sustainment plan. Disposition and demilitarization of the system, which minimize 
environmental and personnel impacts, occurs at the end of the life cycle (OUSD[AT&L], 
2017). 
5. Decision Support System Summary 
The DOD Decision Support System consists of the JCIDS, PPBE, and DAS (DOD, 
2017b). The three interconnected and dependent systems consist of five dimensions: rules, 
players, reviews, decisions, and focus (DOD, 2017b). Figure 5 illustrates the key components 
of each support system. 
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Figure 5.  Five Dimensions of DOD Decision Support Systems. Source: DOD 
(2017b). 
B. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 
1. Budget Control 
The U.S. Constitution gives Congress explicit “power of the purse” to collect taxes 
and spend federal money on various programs or to pay debt obligations. To exercise this 
power, Congress passes authorization and appropriation bills to spend the money under its 
control. This process begins with the president submitting a budget request to Congress 
during the first week of February (Stanton & Yourish, 2010). Using the president’s budget as 
a baseline, the House and Senate propose budget resolutions and then vote on those 
resolutions to provide a framework to make actual budget decisions (Stanton & Yourish, 
2010). Once passed, the House and Senate subcommittees determine the funding levels for 
discretionary programs. One of the subcommittees deals exclusively with defense to create 
an authorization bill, known as the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), followed 
by an appropriation bill known as the Department of Defense Appropriations Act. Figure 6 
illustrates how the president’s budget becomes an appropriations act. 
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Figure 6.  Congressional Enactment Timetable. Source: DOD (2017c). 
Since the defense budget is discretionary, Congress retains funding control over all defense 
spending, including acquisition programs. Although the PPBE process plans for future 
defense expenditures, in any given year, Congress retains the authority to add, subtract, or 
completely abolish the funding planned for specific programs. 
2. Mandatory Reporting Requirements 
To assist Congress in making decisions related to the annual NDAA and to monitor 
performance of MDAPs, acquisition programs must submit Selected Acquisition Reports 
(SARs) to Congress by December of each year. The SARs include updated estimates of cost, 
schedule, and performance status, which includes a comparison to the original program 
baseline (DOD, 2017a). 10 U.S.C. § 2432(b)(2) requires quarterly submissions to Congress if 
there is greater than a 15% increase in program unit acquisition cost or a six-month delay in 
any program schedule milestone since the last SAR submission (Selected Acquisition 
Reports, 2016). In addition, the Nunn-McCurdy Act, originally introduced in the 1982 
NDAA, requires that MDAPs report to Congress when cost overruns exceed a certain 
threshold, known as cost breaches. The two types of cost breaches are significant and critical. 
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In The Nunn-McCurdy Act: Background, Analysis, and Issues for Congress, Moshe Schwartz 
(2015) stated,  
A “significant” breach is when the Program Acquisition Unit Cost (the total 
cost of development, procurement, and construction divided by the number of 
units procured) or the Procurement Unit Cost (the total procurement cost 
divided by the number of units to be procured) increases 15% or more over 
the current baseline estimate or 30% or more over the original baseline 
estimate. A “critical” breach occurs when the program acquisition or the 
procurement unit cost increases 25% or more over the current baseline 
estimate or 50% or more over the original baseline estimate. (“Summary 
section, para. 2) 
In the event of a critical cost breach, program termination is necessary unless the SECDEF 
certifies to Congress that the program is essential to national security and there are no 
acceptable substitutes to the program (Critical Cost Growth in Major Defense Acquisition 
Programs, 2016). Lastly, in 2009, Congress enacted the Weapon System Acquisition Reform 
Act (WSARA), which requires programs to focus on managing technology risk, employing 
realistic program cost estimates, and competitive prototyping, before program initiation 
(Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act, 2015). The purpose is ultimately to create more 
stable programs that allow Congress to understand the framework for how the MDA 
approves program activities and milestones. Overall, Selected Acquisition Reports, the 
Nunn-McCurdy Act, and WSARA are all tools Congress utilizes to monitor MDAP 
performance and make future budget decisions. 
C. GENERAL CAUSES FOR PROGRAM FAILURE 
A failed program, explained further in Chapter III, involves a significant financial 
impact and presents a critical problem in securing warfighter capabilities. The common 
perception in regards to the causation of program failures is that the presence of at least one 
key root cause leads to failure. The key causes collectively thought to contribute to program 
failure in today’s acquisition environment are immature technology, changing requirements, 
poor cost estimation, unstable budgets, schedule-driven programs, and underestimating risk. 
These are extremely general causes, and in fact are difficult to classify as root causes since 
there are underlying actions (i.e., root causes) that lead to these scenarios. Our research 
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indicates that each general cause for failure is widely known and is an important foundation 
for exploring deeper root causes of failure in MDAPs. 
Immature technology often refers to not meeting the appropriate TRL at a given 
milestone (Clowney et al., 2016). The GAO (2009) further expounded on the issue of 
immature technology with the following statement:  
The chief reason for these problems is the encouragement within the 
acquisition environment of overly ambitious and lengthy product 
developments that embody too many technical unknowns and not enough 
knowledge about the performance and production risks they entail. The 
knowledge gaps are largely the result of a lack of early and disciplined 
systems engineering analysis of a weapon system’s requirements prior to 
beginning system development. (p. 8) 
This often leads to acquisition programs with significant technology risk because of the 
inability to mature technology prior to systems development (GAO, 2016).  
Changing requirements refers to not properly controlling client-initiated requirements 
changes or curtailing scope creep due to either vagueness or a poor understanding of scope 
and an inadequate requirements management plan (Clowney et al., 2016). The GAO (2009) 
explained, 
Because the government often does not perform proper up front requirements 
analysis to determine whether the program will meet its needs, significant 
contract cost increases can and do occur as the scope of requirements changes 
or becomes better understood by the government and contractor. (p. 8) 
The significant cost increases driven by changing requirements links to other general causes 
for failure such as poor cost estimation and unstable budgets. This often generates multiple 
causes for failure in a program, as changing requirements will lead to issues with cost 
estimation and potentially unstable budgets because of the associated cost growth. Lastly, the 
GAO also identified unstable requirements as a negative influence that can cause a program 
to fail (Arena et al., 2015). 
 Budget-related activities, which include cost management plans, budget and cost 
estimation, and budget determination, are ranked as the number one reason why programs 
fail by DOD industry programs managers, and the number two reason by DOD program 
managers (Clowney et al., 2016). The GAO identified poor cost estimation, especially 
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optimistic cost estimates, as a negative influence that cause programs to fail (Arena et al., 
2015). This is often due to assigning cost-estimating personnel without the requisite 
knowledge to execute appropriate cost estimates, and proceeding with a program while there 
is substantial requirements uncertainty (GAO, 2009). This also links to the previous general 
cause for failure of changing requirements, which creates problems with the initial cost 
estimation process. Ultimately, poor cost estimation leads to budget variances in the billions, 
which affects future funding commitments, long-term planning, and the ability to accurately 
estimate program risk (GAO, 2009). 
 Unstable budgets also correlate with budget-related activities such as poor cost 
management plans, lack of cost control, and mismanagement of cash flow (Clowney et al., 
2016). Unstable budgets are often the result of the DOD obligating to more programs than 
budget resources dictate, which makes execution of different investments difficult to achieve 
(GAO, 2009). Therefore, programs face the challenge of receiving insufficient funding to 
attain successful program outcomes, which creates instability in the entire DOD acquisition 
portfolio. Lastly, the GAO also identified unstable funding as a negative influence that can 
cause a program to fail (Arena et al., 2015). 
 Schedule-driven programs face issues such as consistent schedule pressure, 
unrealistic duration of milestones, and low-speed decision-making. Overall, schedule-related 
attributes were ranked as the number one reason why programs fail by DOD program 
managers (Clowney et al., 2016). In addition, the GAO also identified optimistic schedule 
estimates as a negative influence that can cause a program to fail (Arena et al., 2015). 
Schedule driven programs connect to other general causes of failure such as immature 
technology, which cause program managers to conduct developmental testing and production 
simultaneously (GAO, 2016). This schedule driven pressure often results in multiple general 
causes for failure present in defense acquisition programs. 
 Underestimating risk refers to the inability of programs personnel to anticipate 
problems and perform appropriate risk assessments (Clowney et al., 2016). Many programs 
receive approval to proceed, but do not consider the resources or technology levels needed to 
successfully execute the program (GAO, 2009). Both insufficient resources and technology 
are risks to the program and must receive appropriate consideration. Therefore, 
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underestimating risk links to all of the previous general causes for failure as risk is inherent 
with technology, requirements, cost/budgets, and schedule. The GAO ultimately indicated 
that programs that underestimate risk often approve inadequate business cases with poor 
knowledge of both requirements and resources required for execution (GAO, 2009). 
The six general causes commonly believed to result in program failure are immature 
technology, changing requirements, poor cost estimation, unstable budgets, schedule-driven 
programs, and underestimating risk. The GAO identified all general causes except for 
underestimating risk as a negative influence that can cause a program to fail. In addition, 
Clowney et al. (2016) identified all general causes for failure as six of the top seven leading 
factors that influence project failure. 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
A. SCOPE 
To identify the root causes of failure for acquisition programs, it is paramount to 
develop an appropriate research scope. The initial scope objective consisted of two 
parameters. The failed programs must include a significant financial impact and present a 
critical problem in securing future warfighter capabilities. For this reason, the first decision 
in regards to scope consisted of selecting only ACAT programs for study. Furthermore, we 
narrowed the scope to only MDAPs (ACAT I), which have the highest dollar value 
thresholds of any ACAT designation and are the most significant programs in terms of 
capability. In FY2016, the DOD was expected to invest $1.4 trillion for the current 79 
MDAP programs, each of which provides substantial upgrades to military capabilities (GAO, 
2017). To ensure the relevance of the root causes, we further narrowed the scope to include 
only programs canceled between FY2001–FY2016. This helps to reduce variability caused 
by different statutory requirements, acquisition process changes, and learning curve 
improvements over time. Next, we selected only programs unable to field complete 
operational systems. Programs canceled during production generally provide some capability 
to the warfighter, just with a smaller production quantity than originally planned. Programs 
with no fielding provide marginal, if any, benefits to the warfighter. Marginal benefits 
include economic value, knowledge, skills, lessons learned, spin-off capabilities and insights 
but do not include any operational systems for use (Clowney et al., 2016). Lastly, we selected 
only programs with greater than $2 billion in sunk costs. This threshold is arbitrary, but the 
uncertainty involved with RDT&E activities for cutting-edge technology indicates that 
programs canceled while minimizing sunk costs are not necessarily failures. Overall, the 
scope of research consists of eight canceled programs. The selection criteria to meet the 
scope objectives consisted of MDAP programs canceled between FY2001–FY2016, no 
fielded products, and greater than $2 billion in sunk costs. Table 4 indicates the programs 
selected for study, the designated service, and the affiliated sunk costs. 
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Table 4.   MDAPs Canceled before Fielding, in Billions of Then-Year Dollars. 
Source: Harrison (2016). 
Program Service Sunk Costs 
Future Combat Systems (FCS) Army 18.1 
Comanche Helicopter Army 7.9 
National Polar-Orbiting Operational Environment Satellite 
System (NPOESS) 
Air Force 5.8 
Airborne Laser Air Force 5.2 
VH-71 Presidential Helicopter Navy 3.7 
Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) Navy 3.3 
Transformational SATCOM (TSAT) Air Force 3.2 
Crusader Army 2.2 
 
B. RESEARCH METHODS 
Data for all eight programs were collected from both government and non-
government sources. We accessed the online government system Defense Acquisition 
Management Information Retrieval (DAMIR) to collect the Selected Acquisition Reports 
(SARs) and Acquisition Program Baselines (APBs) for each program. To complement these 
government documents, we also consulted the Defense Acquisition Visibility Environment 
(DAVE) for any AMDs or other decision documents pertinent to program cancellation, if 
available. Additional government sources included GAO, Congressional Research Service 
(CRS), Office of Performance Assessment and Root Cause Analyses (PARCA) and Inspector 
General (IG) reports. However, the PARCA office only conducts studies related to critical 
cost growth in MDAPs, and not necessarily all terminated or “failed” programs. 10 U.S.C. § 
2433a stipulates that the PARCA conduct an analysis on programs that exceed critical cost 
growth thresholds or when requested by the secretary of defense; the under secretary of 
defense for acquisition, technology, and logistics; the secretary of a military department; or 
the head of a DOD agency (Critical Cost Growth in Major Defense Acquisition Programs, 
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2016). Therefore, the PARCA research assisted in understanding cost growth issues, but did 
not provide an encompassing perspective on root causes for failure. Non-government sources 
included a full open-source search using LexisNexis and Google Scholar to filter reputable 
academic articles, journals, and other published works. In addition, the RAND Corporation 
provided reports and analysis on select programs. 
Data compilation for all eight programs involved the creation of a data matrix. Due to 
the copious amounts of source data, we developed a data matrix to track pertinent 
information from each source. The rows are the eight programs selected for study, and the 
columns are the different data sources such as SARs, APBs, and so on. To capture the “root 
causes” of failure during research is not a clear process, as even the PARCA office whose 
mission is to conduct root cause research focuses only on cost growth. Therefore, we 
incorporated any information pertaining to program entry points, re-baselines, breaches, 
cancellations, and any miscellaneous program problems into the data matrix. By collecting 
and consolidating data from a consistent group of sources, coupled with the development of 
an appropriate scope, we normalized as many variables as possible before the data analysis. 
C. FAILURE CONSIDERATIONS 
Program cancellation or contract termination is not synonymous with program failure. 
In fact, programs that experience a termination or cancellation are often successful, 
especially early in RDT&E activities. In an environment dealing with the development of 
state-of-the-art technology and military-specific equipment, it is unreasonable to expect 
every program to result in a fielded system. Although not a DOD entity, the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) understands that to create breakthroughs in 
science and technology, many projects will not produce a tangible product. Private research 
laboratories such as X, a department of the company Google, understand this dilemma as 
well. The X (n.d.) website states,  
We’re a moonshot factory. Our mission is to invent and launch “moonshot” 
technologies that we hope could someday make the world a radically better 
place. … One of our most important principles is to run as fast as we can at all 
the hardest parts of a problem, and try to prove that something can’t be done. 
We want to force ourselves to learn. We actively embrace failure: by making 
mistakes, we make progress. In this way, our ideas get stronger faster, or we 
discard them and move on to new ones.  
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The key component for determining a successful cancellation or termination for 
defense acquisition programs is controlling the resource inputs. Not every MDAP program 
results in a fielded system. However, if program teams control resources such as fiscal 
expenditures, human assets, and government equipment, a cancellation is not necessarily a 
failure, because the government gains knowledge and lessons learned at a reasonable cost. A 
program with high sunk costs and no complete fielded products is the worst-case scenario for 
failure. The warfighter does not receive any tangible product, and the government 
unnecessarily expends resources to conclude that a program is not viable for future 
development and production. In a letter to now-former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, 
five former deputy secretaries of defense highlighted the issue: 
The hard choices should be made early. The federal budget outlook is not 
projected to improve for several years. So if a program or capability is not 
affordable now it is unlikely to be affordable going forward. Delaying hard 
choices means that resources will be spent on systems that will never be built 
and not be available at the right levels for the highest priority programs and 
capabilities. (Porter et al., 2015, p. iii) 
Although the letter primarily addressed affordability, the concept of making a difficult choice 
and canceling unfeasible programs as early as possible is clear. Therefore, we concluded that 
only MDAP programs with greater than $2 billion in sunk costs and no complete fielded 
systems were truly failures appropriate for study. 
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
A. PROGRAM SUMMARIES 
1. Future Combat Systems 
To initiate the Future Combat System (FCS) program, the Army utilized DARPA to 
perform the initial design and development work by employing an Other Transactions 
Authority (OTA) arrangement to award and administer the program from 2000–2005 
(Feickert, 2006). With that, the program execution included an evolutionary strategy to 
produce increments with increasing capability (Pernin et al., 2012). Since the products and 
requirements were likely to change and time was a critical factor to meet warfighter needs, 
the program manager supported the selection of an evolutionary approach (Pernin et al., 
2012). However, the FCS acquisition program did not conduct an MSA or Milestone A 
decision (DOD, 2005a). The MSA translates validated capability gaps into system-specific 
requirements, and the analysis of alternatives conducted during this period assesses the trade 
space between all potential materiel solutions in terms of cost, schedule, risk, and 
performance. According to the GAO, the FCS program commenced without a sound 
acquisition strategy or business approach, which led to a failure to execute a knowledge-
based acquisition. Furthermore, the failure to achieve consistent technical progress during 
development led to affordability issues due to continued spending during development and 
then subsequent congressional budget reductions (GAO, 2010b). In fact, the technical issues 
eventually resulted in a Milestone B approval without meeting the minimum TRL 
requirements or completing a preliminary design review (Pernin et al., 2012). Lastly, changes 
in the national security strategy and operational warfare environment, due in large part to the 
September 11 terrorist attacks, created a large discrepancy between the FCS operational 
concepts and current warfare strategy (GAO, 2010a). 
Research indicates that the findings stipulated in various government reports translate 
into four root causes for failure. First, the program waived a Milestone A approval, hindering 
the ability of the program to validate capability gaps; assess the estimated cost, schedule, and 
performance of the proposed solution; and develop a sound business approach. The second 
root cause for failure points to repeated congressional involvement, especially in regards to 
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cutting budgets when the program experienced cost overruns in development. Instead of 
adjusting the budget to fit the needs of a developing and cutting-edge acquisition program, or 
at the very least maintaining a stable budget figure, Congress cut FCS budget requests on at 
least three separate occasions (DOD, 2007). The third root cause for failure is the lack of 
control for technology progression. The design and development of the FCS took longer and 
cost more money than originally expected; however, this is a common circumstance for a 
state-of-the-art acquisition program. A root cause for failure arises when the acquisition 
program allows the achievement of a milestone decision with inadequate technology, 
resulting in potential future cost overruns for the program, and expectations from Congress 
that a program is progressing as planned. The last root cause for failure in the FCS program 
is a vast change in warfighter requirements. The national security strategy and operational 
environments changed drastically due to the September 11 attacks and subsequent wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. This resulted in the FCS program capabilities becoming obsolete for 
the current warfighter needs.  
2. Comanche Helicopter 
The Comanche Helicopter acquisition program did conduct a Milestone A decision 
(formerly known as Milestone I) in 1988, with a Milestone B approval not coming until 2000 
(DOD, 2002). The predominant reason for the delay involved multiple development and 
design issues, which required the program to invest additional program budget to achieve the 
appropriate technology levels. However, the GAO stated that the Comanche program is a 
good example of attaining key product knowledge as the acquisition program milestones 
progressed commensurate with the technological maturity (GAO, 2004a). The downside to 
acquiring key product knowledge was that high development costs drove the unaffordability 
of each Comanche Helicopter, as “the estimated cost of each aircraft had soared to $53 
million from an original target of $8 million” (Merle, 2004, p. 1). Program initiation occurred 
well before the DOD stated that evolutionary was the preferred acquisition approach, but 
shortly after the announcement, the Comanche program did restructure the approach to 
incorporate an evolutionary strategy (GAO, 2004a). The acquisition office appropriately 
applied an evolutionary approach since new and changing requirements existed, which 
helped balance the program by spreading out requirements (GAO, 2004a). Lastly, changes in 
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the national security strategy and operational warfare environment, due in large part to the 
September 11 terrorist attacks, led to a Comanche program “no longer consistent with the 
changed operational environment” (Merle, 2004, p. 2). 
The Comanche Helicopter program experienced two key root causes for failure. First, 
the program did not control technology progression. Unlike the FCS, which allowed 
milestone approvals before technological maturity, the Comanche program progressed far too 
slowly, resulting in research and development costs that quadrupled and a schedule dictating 
a 21-year period before initial capability (GAO, 2004b). The accumulation of these 
development costs eventually resulted in the total unit cost for each helicopter being 
unaffordable. Even with a switch to an evolutionary acquisition approach, the program failed 
to meet technological maturity for the first increment. The second root cause for failure in the 
Comanche program is a vast change in warfighter requirements. The national security 
strategy and operational environments changed drastically due to the September 11 attacks 
and subsequent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This resulted in the Comanche program 
capabilities becoming obsolete for the current warfighter needs.    
3. National Polar-Orbiting Operational Environment Satellite System 
The NPOESS acquisition program did conduct a Milestone A decision as a tri-agency 
program between the Department of Commerce (National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration), DOD, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA; 
GAO, 2011b). A Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) research study cites cost 
growth, schedule delays, and management issues as the primary reasons for failure of the 
NPOESS program (Dwyer, Szajnfarber, Cameron, Bradford, & Crawley, 2014). In 2011, a 
congressional investigation stated major performance problems and schedule delays led to 
significant cost overruns, but that all of those factors resulted from a dysfunctional 
management structure between the three agencies (From NPOESS to JPSS, 2011). The 
NPOESS program pursued a single step acquisition approach with only six satellites planned 
for launch (GAO, 2008b). A study by the RAND Corporation indicated that the maturation of 
the space industry, failure intolerant approach from customers, and high launch costs created 
expectations that all satellites must work to near perfection and include all required 
capabilities (Arena et al., 2015). Due to the NPOESS program possessing binary 
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requirements for key capabilities and a maintenance intensive system with constant ground 
monitoring the use of a single step acquisition approach is appropriate. 
Ultimately, the research findings on the NPOESS program lead back to one key root 
cause for failure, a poor management structure between the agencies. The lack of governance 
rules and management roles made the organizational complexity, differing financial 
responsibility, and requirements approval process almost impossible to manage. The tri-
agency process made it difficult to follow both the JCIDS and PPBE structure that 
appropriately manage the requirements and budgeting process. 
4. Airborne Laser 
The Airborne Laser acquisition program did conduct a Milestone A decision in 1996 
(DOD, 1999). The program followed a single step acquisition approach since it began before 
2000, and no research indicates that a switch to an evolutionary approach ever occurred. The 
Airborne Laser program involved binary requirements for its key capabilities such as 
developing a high-energy laser aboard a Boeing 747 to destroy ballistic missiles during the 
boost phase of flight; thus, a single step approach was appropriate. According to the GAO, 
affordability and technical concerns ultimately led to the cancellation of the Airborne Laser 
program (GAO, 2011c). The failure to achieve consistent technical progress during the first 
few years of development led to affordability issues, with a seven-year schedule delay and 
increased budget estimate of $4 billion (GAO, 2011c). In turn, the lack of technical progress 
led to congressional budget cuts in 2001, which removed $647 million of RDT&E funding 
out of the FY2001–FY2005 FYDP, led to a three-year increase in the schedule, and caused 
an overall program budget increase of $845 million (DOD, 1999). 
The Airborne Laser program experienced two key root causes for failure. First, the 
program did not control technology progression. The Airborne Laser program repeatedly 
increased its RDT&E budget and schedule requests to continue development and design 
work at levels below TRL 6. Overall, the program invested more than $5 billion and 14 years 
of schedule, while never receiving a Milestone B approval (GAO, 2011c). This root cause 
arises when technology expectations are unrealistic and program decisions do not consider 
previously incurred costs as sunk. The second root cause for failure involves repeated 
congressional involvement pertaining to budget cuts in development. By steadily cutting the 
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short-term development budget, congressional involvement makes it difficult to invest the 
time and resources to conclude that the technology is either not feasible, or to have the 
program progress in an affordable manner. Instead, the development budget stretches over an 
increasingly long period, making the technology assessment very slow, and long-run costs 
extremely high. 
5. VH-71 Presidential Helicopter 
The VH-71 program included an evolutionary approach with increment one meeting 
some operational requirements, and the second increment providing the full operational 
capability (O’Rourke, 2009). Due to the time criticality of the program driven by the 
September 11 terrorist attacks, and because certain requirements were susceptible to change, 
the program properly applied an evolutionary approach. The VH-71 Presidential Helicopter 
acquisition program did not conduct an MSA or Milestone A decision, and in fact, the 
program received its initial approvals of both Milestone B & C simultaneously in 2005 
(O’Rourke, 2009). As a result, the program scheduled the design, test and production phases 
to take place concurrently (Tiron, 2007). Furthermore, the program delayed the best practice 
of conducting a preliminary design review by 13 months and critical design review by two 
years (GAO, 2011a). The PDR is a TMRR activity required before Milestone B approval, 
which establishes the allocated baseline, and ensures the design has a reasonable expectation 
of meeting the system requirements within budget and schedule. The GAO stated that the 
eventual termination of the program resulted from cost growth, schedule delays, and poor 
system performance from immature technologies (GAO, 2011a). Due to technological 
challenges at an advanced stage in the acquisition system, the program office initiated a 
substantial redesign, driving significant cost growth in the program (Baker, 2008). Lastly, the 
program experienced a mandate by Congress and the White House to compress the schedule, 
thus entering the acquisition with a Milestone B & C approval, along with various budget 
cuts by Congress because of slow development activities (Tiron, 2007). 
Our research shows that the previous findings equate to three root causes of failure. 
First, the program waived a Milestone A approval and immediately entered the program with 
both Milestone B and C approvals. This directly conflicted with a GAO best practice, and 
significantly hindered the ability of the program to perform the appropriate systems 
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engineering analysis, address preliminary design issues, and develop an appropriate business 
case, to include an analysis of alternatives. The second root cause for failure in the VH-71 
program is the lack of control for technology progression. As seen in the FCS program, this 
program allowed the approval of Milestone B with an inadequate TRL for the program and 
without a stable design. When the VH-71 program proceeded past Milestone B without 
feasible technology, the program experienced cost growth from redesign work and additional 
development costs. The last root cause for failure is from repeated congressional 
involvement, especially the mandate to compress the program schedule (a key reason for 
bypassing Milestone A), and cutting RDT&E funding by $50 million due to slow 
technological development. The extreme schedule pressure emphasized the need to 
efficiently and effectively complete development work; however, budget cuts to a program 
already struggling with development only exacerbates the problem instead of motivating 
personnel to fix the issue. 
6. Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle 
The Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle acquisition program did conduct a Milestone A 
decision in 1995 (DOD, 2010). Program initiation occurred well before the DOD selected 
evolutionary as the preferred acquisition approach, but after the announcement there is no 
indication that the Comanche program was restructured to incorporate an evolutionary 
strategy. The EFV had both time sensitivity to produce a warfighter capability and 
requirements likely to change over time, indicating the suitability of an evolutionary 
approach. The GAO stated that the EFV program suffered from substantial historical cost 
growth and significant reliability problems in regards to the operational use of the systems 
technology (GAO, 2010c). After the Milestone B approval, and during the EMD phase of the 
defense acquisition system, the Congressional Research Service stated that the original 
schedule to demonstrate technological maturity of the EFV and incorporate results of tests 
into design changes had proved insufficient (Feickert, 2011). Thus, attempting to meet the 
demands of the schedule did not allow sufficient time to mature the operational technology 
and incorporate changes into the production design. By 2007, the national security strategy 
led to a change in the Marines’ ground mobility strategy, which resulted in a production 
quantity reduction of EFVs from 1,013 to 573 (“Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV),” 
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n.d.). Ultimately, the reduced quantities led to a unit cost Nunn-McCurdy breach, indicating 
an unaffordable program and significant cost growth. 
The EFV experienced three key root causes for failure. First, the EFV program did 
not pursue an evolutionary acquisition approach. The program consistently struggled with 
maturing technology, especially during EMD. An evolutionary approach affords the program 
additional time to develop an operational end capability using increments instead of 
attempting to meet all technology objectives for one complete end system. Second, the 
program did not control technology progression. Although the program instituted a 
successful TMRR phase and Milestone B with a TRL 6, they did not follow the same process 
during EMD. Instead of allowing marginal schedule growth to fix design issues, and then re-
testing to confirm the solution, the program continued to move forward without mature 
technology until critical failures resulted in three program re-baselines and over three years 
of additional schedule (Feickert, 2011). The re-baselines resulted in substantial cost growth 
and significantly contributed to the program becoming unaffordable and unreliable. The third 
root cause for failure in the EFV program is a vast change in warfighter requirements. The 
National Security Strategy and subsequently the Marines’ ground mobility strategy changed 
due to the constant counterinsurgency wars fought in Iraq and Afghanistan. This resulted in a 
substantial quantity reduction in EFVs, driving the unit cost per EFV to be unaffordable, and 
highlighting the program’s significant cost growth with a Nunn-McCurdy breach. 
7. Transformational SATCOM 
The Transformational Satellite Communications (SATCOM) acquisition program did 
not conduct an MSA or Milestone A decision (DOD, 2005b). To help establish reliable cost, 
schedule, and performance estimates without Milestone A, the GAO recommended the 
program develop a sound business case by achieving pillars of knowledge such as early 
design studies, but the schedule did not allow for these activities (GAO, 2003). In addition, a 
Milestone B approval initiated the program in 2004 with only one of the seven critical 
technologies being mature (GAO, 2006a). Due to unreliable cost, schedule, and performance 
goals and initial development concerns related to immature technology, Congress twice 
reduced the program’s funding during development (GAO, 2006a). The first budget cut in 
2004 resulted in a budget reduction from $774 million to $474 million, which also triggered a 
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Nunn-McCurdy breach in schedule due to a corresponding schedule slip (DOD, 2004). 
Lastly, the Transformational SATCOM program implemented a single step acquisition 
approach, which at the time of the decision fit the DOD preference to make fewer but more 
complex satellites rather than large constellations of less complex satellites (GAO, 2006b). 
As with the NPOESS program this preference is due to the maturation of the space industry, 
failure intolerant approach from customers, and high launch costs (Arena et al., 2015). 
Eventually, the DOD agreed to reduce initial capabilities to pursue an evolutionary approach, 
but the program received a termination shortly after this decision (GAO, 2006a). At the time 
the TSAT program correctly applied a single step acquisition approach. However, recent 
breakthroughs in launch vehicles, which greatly reduce costs, may dictate a switch to satellite 
systems following an evolutionary approach. 
Our research shows that the previous findings translate into three root causes of 
failure. First, the program waived Milestone A and immediately entered the program with a 
Milestone B approval. This directly conflicted with a GAO recommendation and did not 
allow the program to develop a sound business case, realistic cost, schedule, or performance 
estimates, or the appropriate pillars of knowledge (design studies and mature technologies) to 
be successful. The second root cause for failure in the TSAT program is the lack of control 
for technology progression. This program allowed a Milestone B approval without mature 
technology, resulting in schedule slips and budget cuts due to the additional time and effort 
needed to support development activities. The last root cause for failure is from repeated 
congressional involvement, especially in regards to two budget cuts during development, the 
first of which resulted in a $300 million reduction. This directly caused a Nunn-McCurdy 
breach and did not provide sufficient resources to the program to work through technology 
development issues, and meet the necessary schedule and life-cycle budget goals. 
8. Crusader 
The Crusader acquisition program did conduct a Milestone A decision in 1994 (DOD, 
2001). Program initiation occurred well before the DOD stated evolutionary as the preferred 
acquisition approach, and then a termination decision started in 2002, not allowing enough 
time for a switch to an evolutionary strategy (GAO, 2002). The GAO stated that the key 
reason to cancel the Crusader was because “the warfighter no longer needed a 60-ton 
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armored cannon to combat Soviet forces on the battlefields of Europe” (GAO, 2008a, p. 2). 
In addition, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated that the Crusader is not relevant in 
21st-century warfare (Dao, 2002). The DOD also ignored a GAO recommendation and best 
practice to further mature technologies before production, but the program received a 
termination determination before the start of production (GAO, 2002). This also indicates 
that the program progressed adequately under the single step acquisition approach. 
Our research indicates the sole root cause for failure in the Crusader program is a vast 
change in warfighter requirements. The national security strategy and operational 
environments changed drastically due to the September 11 attacks and subsequent wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. This resulted in the Crusader program capabilities becoming obsolete 
for the current warfighter needs and the Army’s planned transformation to a lighter and more 
deployable future force.  
B. ROOT CAUSE CATEGORIES 
The research and root cause analysis indicates that broad categories exist for root 
causes for failure. To eliminate outliers and create statistically significant categories that link 
root causes to program failure, we developed a threshold for each category. At a minimum, 
three out of the eight programs, or 37.5% of the programs studied, must contain a root cause 
that fits into the same broad category. This eliminates the possibility of creating a categories 
based on root causes seen as outliers in only one or two programs. 
The first broad category is entering the acquisition program without an MSA or 
Milestone A approval. Three of eight failed programs, or 37.5% of the programs studied, did 
not conduct a Milestone A approval. The second broad category is an insurmountable 
requirements change driven by the needs of the warfighter resulting in adjusting the national 
security strategy. Four of eight failed programs, or 50% of the programs studied experienced 
a drastic change in force requirements. The third broad category is congressional 
involvement, especially in regards to cutting budgets during program development. Four of 
eight failed programs, or 50% of the programs studied, experienced a drastic change to the 
program structure due to congressional involvement. The last broad category is a lack of 
control in technology progression involving both the approval of milestones without matured 
technology and spending an unrealistic amount of resources on creating a technical solution. 
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Six of eight failed programs, or 75% of the programs studied, experienced some form of poor 
technology progression. Table 5 indicates which studied programs experienced a root cause 
of failure in each of the broad categories. 
Table 5.   Broad Categories of Failure 








FCS X X X X 
Comanche   X  X 
NPOESS     
Airborne Laser   X X 
VH-71  X  X X 
 EFV  X  X 
 TSAT X  X X 
Crusader  X   
 
C. NORMALIZATION ACROSS MDAPS 
Our research indicates that the broad categories for root causes of failure in a select 
set of MDAPs are applicable to other MDAPs. The categories are general in nature and 
involve root causes that may exist in any MDAP, not just the research subset. Most MDAPs 
face the same statutory and regulatory requirements, which should normalize the programs 
enough to apply the lessons learned from this research. In addition, many research documents 
cross-referenced acquisition programs not specifically studied, with frequent mentions of 
root causes similar to the broad categories. Although not every other failed MDAP will fit 
into each broad category, the likelihood of at least one root cause category is extremely high. 
Of the selected set of programs for study, seven out of eight programs, or 87.5% had a root 
cause for failure in at least one broad category. The root causes for failure that are outliers 
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and do not fit into broad categories are extremely difficult to normalize and apply broadly. 
For instance, the NPOESS and EFV programs experienced a root cause outlier, but just one 
reference point is not possible to apply to other programs. 
The selected set of programs normalized variables for program classification 
(MDAPs), the timeframe for cancellation (2001–2016), the inability to field operational 
systems, and the presence of sunk costs of more than $2 billion. After grouping the root 
causes for failure into broad categories, there are apparent commonalities between the root 
causes in this set of MDAPs. First, every program which waived the Milestone A approval 
eventually experienced a negative congressional involvement. Furthermore, every program 
that experienced a congressional involvement also faced issues with the technological 
progression of the program. The commonalities show that if a program waives the Milestone 
A requirement, in all likelihood, it will experience both a congressional action hindering the 
program and difficulty with appropriately developing the technology. Anytime a program 
waives Milestone A, the root causes of congressional involvement and technology 
progression are no longer mutually independent. The same rule applies to congressional 
involvement and technological progression. If congressional involvement is present, then 
there will also be issues with technology development. However, these events are not always 
in chronological order. This research did not determine the relative strength of each root 
cause for failure, but the presence of more than one root cause of failure indicates a higher 
probability of eventual program failure. Six of eight failed programs, or 75% of the programs 
studied experienced more than one root cause for failure. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the four broad categories of root causes of failure in acquisition programs, 
our team compiled recommendations to mitigate root causes of failure for future programs. 
These recommendations consider the current acquisition environment and statutory 
requirements for stakeholders. However, the recommendations are not all encompassing 
since it is critical to understand the root causes of failure in prior programs to apply lessons 
learned to future programs. 
All future MDAPs, regardless of schedule demands or perceived technological 
maturity, should conduct a materiel solution analysis and only proceed into TMRR with a 
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Milestone A approval from the MDA. The MSA phase allows the program manager and 
leadership to select a preferred materiel solution through an analysis of alternatives that 
addresses the capability gaps identified in the JCIDS process. If time is a critical factor, it is 
possible to focus additional resources on achieving Milestone A in a shortened timeframe, 
which is a preferred tradeoff to entering the acquisition program without a legitimate 
business case. Lastly, Milestone A helps build a cohesive government program team that 
jointly develops realistic cost, schedule, and performance expectations for the program. 
These realistic expectations are critical to avoid future issues with congressional involvement 
and poor technology progression. 
It is possible to address requirements obsolescence due to a changing national 
security strategy or warfare environment in a few ways. First, acquisition programs must 
constantly review changes in service-specific strategy and national security strategy to ensure 
proper alignment with capability gaps. To assist in this process, an annual or biannual JCIDS 
assessment throughput the program life cycle may help to validate the capability gaps met by 
the acquisition program. This allows for either incremental changes to the acquisition 
program or a much earlier decision to terminate the program, greatly reducing sunk costs. 
The second recommendation involves designing systems with an open architecture concept 
with adaptability to meet many of the changes necessary throughout a long product 
development cycle. It is almost impossible to predict a catastrophic event such as the 
September 11 terrorist attacks, which revolutionized warfighting strategy, but designing 
systems with an adaptable structure allows for a potential solution to meet new capability 
gaps. 
Congressional involvement often takes place after an annual SAR submission that 
contains negative program issues or after a Nunn-McCurdy breach takes place. To mitigate 
congressional involvement, it is important to set realistic program expectations, including 
creating a development budget that considers the challenges of meeting TRL objectives. 
Furthermore, implementing a pre-notification process to notify Congress of any predicted 
Nunn-McCurdy breaches or poor annual SAR assessments will afford Congress adequate 
time to consider the appropriate course of action. 
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Lastly, the most common root cause of failure in acquisition programs is poor 
technology progression. To address this issue, acquisition programs should no longer move 
forward with the defense acquisition system process until reaching the appropriate technical 
maturity. Especially important is ensuring all critical technologies reach a TRL 6, which is 
demonstration in a relevant environment before a Milestone B approval. On the flipside, 
programs must understand their resource limitations and cannot stagnate in the TMRR phase 
and utilize resources for too long; otherwise the unit cost for systems becomes unaffordable. 
The programs must define critical limitations for resource allocations and schedule upfront 
with only marginal changes during development, as opposed to the re-baselining method 
currently used. For innovative technology with little to no current design or development 
work, specifically TRLs 1–3, the programs should not be responsible for maturation. Instead, 
outside organizations such as DARPA, military research laboratories, or federally funded 
research and development centers (FFRDC) are much better suited to handle initial 
development work. It is not necessarily a failure to prove that technology is unfeasible early 
in development, since it saves all of the future investment costs. Programs do not embrace 
this concept; however, independent research organizations are more comfortable with 
making this assessment. 
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V. CONCLUSION AND AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH 
A. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
Execution of MDAPs occurs in a harsh budgetary, political, and resource-constrained 
environment. Our research shows that all studied MDAP programs lead back to at least one 
root cause for failure. Often, failed programs experience more than one root cause, 
strengthening the probability of failure. Many of the root causes discovered fit into the four 
broad categories of entering the acquisition program without an MSA or Milestone A 
approval, vast requirement changes driven by the national security strategy adjusting to the 
needs of the warfighter, negative congressional involvement, and lack of control in 
technology progression. These categories are broad enough to apply lessons learned to all 
current and future MDAPs, since all programs fall under similar statutory and regulatory 
requirements. Ultimately, the findings generated a series of recommendations to counteract 
future root causes of failure in MDAPs. 
B. STUDY LIMITATIONS 
The data used in this study is almost exclusively from government sources, or from 
an entity contracted by the government to perform research. The key sources are SARs, 
APBs, and GAO, PARCA, IG, and CRS reports, all of which the government produces, 
while the RAND Corporation created reports backed by government funding. Most academic 
and open source articles also heavily rely on the aforementioned government source data. To 
conduct a thorough root cause analysis, a 360-degree perspective of all stakeholders is 
necessary, with an equal emphasis on the perspective of prime contractors and subcontractors 
involved with the program. Although government reports document factual circumstances 
surrounding acquisition programs, often times it is difficult to remove all bias concerning the 
responsibility of why an acquisition program failed. In addition, we did not conduct research 
surveys or interviews to ask directed questions about program specifics and conditions 
relating to program failure from either government or contractor sources. 
The infrequent number of cancelled MDAPs with sunk costs greater than $2 billion 
and no fielded systems is another limiting factor. Due to such a small sample size, there is 
simply not enough source data to confirm the conclusions drawn from the analysis. Over 
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time, it is possible to compare the conclusions of this report with future failed programs 
within the defined scope parameters to validate whether the common root causes are indeed 
present to support the current findings. Although this research did attempt to scope MDAPs 
to align as many variables as possible, the distinct differences between programs even within 
the current scope make the categorization of similar root causes of failure very difficult. 
Lastly, although we conducted a complete analysis of the available information, it is 
still difficult to conclude that there is a direct correlation between root causes and program 
failures for individual programs. However, by finding commonalities between the root causes 
for failure in different programs, our conclusions are more robust and are applicable for 
future programs. It is critical to ensure that any future programs that learn from this study are 
of the same size and scope to ensure the variables are as similar as possible, and that the 
lessons learned incorporate common root causes for failure, not just isolated instances on 
single programs.  
C. AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH 
In addition to utilizing all open source and government data for research, conducting 
interviews and surveys with program stakeholders is another way to gather critical research 
material. This would allow for additional and potentially more candid responses from 
personnel with a vested interest in the programs. Suggested stakeholders include program 
teams, integrated product team (IPT) members, prime contractors, subcontractors, 
requirement users, and congressional stakeholders. With the additional research, it is possible 
to enhance the conclusions of this report by supporting or altering findings with additional 
data points. 
Another research possibility is to conduct a project focused on defining what 
constitutes a successful MDAP program. After defining the parameters for success, it is 
possible select a set of MDAPs meeting the criteria for a successful program. Furthermore, it 
is possible to research and identify whether any root causes for failure are present in the 
successful programs, which may indicate a false positive from this research report. 
Otherwise, the outcomes then support the research findings from this report, as root causes of 
failure are not present in successful programs. Additionally, it is possible to develop best 
practices or risk areas from this report to apply to future programs. This allows an 
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opportunity to track the results of future programs that received training on potential root 
causes for failure. 
Lastly, the congressional impact on acquisition programs is a critical area for further 
research. It is paramount to understand whether the control mechanisms utilized by Congress 
affect the program as intended, or are a detriment to future program success. Throughout the 
programs considered in our research, Congress took action to change the parameters of a 
program; however, no research indicates whether these actions were indeed effective in 
achieving the intended outcomes. 
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